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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. BOWLES 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
Case No. 900428-CA 
BEVAN C. BOWLES, Civil No. 87440078 
Defendant/Appellant. | Priority No. 16 
Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court as Appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1987, 
as amended), (hereinafter U.C.A.). 
Nature of Proceeding 
This is an appeal in a domestic relations case from a 
final Court Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Utah County, State of Utah, which order denied Appellant Bevan 
Bowles' Petition for Modification of a Decree of Divorce. 
Statement of Issues 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding no change 
of circumstances based upon Mr. Bowies' involuntary lay off from 
his employment at Signetics Company in September, 1989. 
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2. Whether the trial court made sufficient or accurate 
findings of fact upon which to base its Order denying any 
adjustment to Mr. Bowies' level of child support. 
3. Whether the Court erred in failing to consider the 
evidence presented by Mr. Bowles showing his efforts to find 
employment and in taking "judicial notice" of disputed factual 
matters outside of the record. 
4. Whether the Court erred in its application of the 
child support guidelines at U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(7) where the Court 
imputed income to Mr. Bowles at the level of his most recent past 
employment from which he was involuntarily laid off rather than 
relying on Mr. Bowies' evidence of his actual earnings or his 
evidence of historical earnings. 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended at the following 
sections: 
a. §78-45-7 (Child Support Guidelines); 
b. §78-45-7.5 (Determination of Gross Income, 
Imputed Income); 
c. §30-3-5 (Continuing jurisdiction of the Court 
to modify support orders). 
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Statement of the Case 
This an appeal from a final Court Order on a Petition for 
Modification in a domestic relations case issued by Judge Cullen Y. 
Christensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah. The Defendant/Appellant Bevan Bowles had 
filed a Petition for Modification seeking to modify the parties' 
Decree of Divorce which was issued three years earlier. Mr. 
Bowles sought an adjustment to his child support obligation based 
on his involuntary lay off from employment, as well as a court 
review of issues of visitation and tax exemptions. A hearing was 
held on June 20, 1990, where only the parties were witnesses and 
the Court ruled that Mr. Bowles failed to show a substantial change 
in circumstances to support an adjustment to child support and had 
not made reasonable efforts to locate new employment. Mr. Bowles 
filed a Notice of Appeal dated August 2, 1990, the Docketing 
Statement was filed on August 24, 1990. 
Statement of Facts 
1. After a 13 year marriage, the parties to this action 
were divorced on July 6, 1987, and Respondent Janet Bowles was 
awarded custody of the parties two minor children age 12 and 14 at 
the time of the modification hearing. Mr. Bowles was ordered to 
pay child support in the amount of $326 per child per month. 
(Record at 15; hereinafter R. 15). 
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2. Mr. Bowies' child support obligation was modified 
pursuant to a hearing and an Order dated February 27, 1989, where 
support was adjusted to the sum of $272 per child per month from 
that day forward. (R. 53). 
3. In August, 1989, Mr. Bowles was told by his employer 
Signetics Company that he would be laid off. He asked his ex-wife 
for a temporary, voluntary reduction in child support pending his 
finding new employment commensurate with the amount of unemployment 
compensation he would be receiving. Mrs. Bowles refused to make 
any voluntary adjustment to child support. (R. 56) 
4. In September, 1989, Mr. Bowles filed a Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce alleging a substantial change of 
circumstances based on his lay off from employment with Signetics 
Company effective September 29, 1989. (R. 56). 
5. Mr. Bowles was employed by Signetics Company as a 
construction worker from November, 1983, until September, 1989, a 
total of approximately six years. (Transcript p. 6; hereinafter T. 
6). Although Signetics is primarily a manufacturer of 
semiconductors it employed a staff of construction workers for 
plant remodeling. Mr. Bowles thus received above-average wages for 
construction work, year round employment and benefits—all 
exceptional attributes for construction work which is typically 
unstable, seasonal and without benefits. (T. 15). 
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6. At the time Mr. Bowies' was laid off he was earning 
a gross monthly salary of $2,658 per month. (T. 7, Exhibit 1). 
1. After his lay off Mr. Bowles began to receive 
unemployment compensation initially for a period of 26 weeks at the 
rate of $208 per week, a total of $894 gross per month. (T. 8). 
8. At the time of his lay off Mr. Bowles met with the 
Office of Recovery Services to inform them of his changed situation 
and entered into a wage assignment agreement where that Office 
deducted one-half of every unemployment compensation check received 
by him which was paid to Respondent as child support, a total of 
$412 per month. (T. 10, 63, Exhibit 1). 
9. Prior to his employment at Signetics Mr. Bowles was 
self-employed in the excavation business where he owned a back hoe 
and would contract out his personal labor. Mr. Bowles earned his 
living in this manner for three years from 1981 through 1983. (T. 
10, 11). Mr. Bowles testified from the parties' income tax returns 
as to his earnings for these three years which average $738 per 
month. (Addendum - Chart 1) (T. 12-14). 
10. Mr. Bowles testified that during the years 1981 
through 1983 his family in fact received loans and gifts of money 
from their family as his earnings were inadequate to meet basic 
expenses. (T. 14)• 
5 
11* At the time of his lay off, Mr. Bowies' educational 
credentials consist of a high school diploma and excavation license 
(T. 11)-
12. Mr. Bowles testified that his salary at Signetics 
was the most he had ever earned as a construction worker and that 
his beginning wage was $9 per hour when he was hired in November, 
1983 and that his ending wage was $13.42 per hour when he was laid 
off* (T. 14-15). 
13. Mr. Bowles testified that his employment at 
Signetics was not typical of the construction industry overall as 
there he received a salary and benefits and worked 12 months a year 
whereas generally construction work is lower pay, sporadic, 
seasonal, and without employment benefits. (T. 15). 
14. Mr. Bowles testified that he began seeking 
employment before his lay off in September and met all the 
requirements to receive unemployment compensation consisting of at 
least two job applications per week. (T. 16, 17). 
15. Mr. Bowles searched for construction and excavation 
work and also applied for advertised jobs and those forwarded to 
him by Job Service. He testified that he looked in the Provo-Orem 
area as well as Salt Lake and St. George. He named at least six 
construction companies he had applied with in these areas as well 
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as efforts he made through friends in the construction industry to 
find available jobs. (T. 18). 
16. In mid-December, 1989, Mr. Bowles determined he 
could not find employment in the construction industry and because 
the industry itself was unstable and seasonal, that he needed to 
consider job training which would allow him more stable and 
lucrative employment. (T. 19). He also testified that he had 
depleted his financial resources (retirement and IRA's) to keep 
current in his child support and make up the shortfall in his 
expenses (T. 23). 
17. Mr. Bowles qualified for a State sponsored Job 
Training Program through Job Service as his work for Signetics was 
classified as an industry affected by foreign competition 
(semiconductors) which had caused his lay offs. The job retraining 
program requirements provided that unemployment compensation would 
be extended up to a year so long as the applicant maintained full-
time student status of at least 12 hours. (T. 9, 20). 
18. Mr. Bowles began attending Dixie College in January, 
1990, and estimated he would complete a nursing or x-ray technician 
program by the Spring of 1993. (T. 21, 43). He has maintained at 
least 12 hours and a "BM average and testified he had approximately 
three hours of class daily and three hours per class hour of 
homework daily. (T. 59). 
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19. Since his lay off Mr. Bowles also obtained part-time 
employment at a convenience store earning approximately $60 per 
week. (T. 21, 22). Thus, at the time of the hearing he was earning 
$894 from unemployment compensation and $260 from part-time work 
for a total of $1,154 per month. The sum of $412 per month of 
this total was being withheld as child support, leaving Mr. Bowles 
$754 for his personal expenses. (T. 24-25). 
20. Mr. Bowles testified to and filed a pre-trial 
settlement statement reporting his personal monthly expenses to be 
$1,294 per month which increases to $1,694 a month when child 
support of $412 is added. (R. 88). Mr. Bowles testified that he 
had been able to maintain the expense shortfall by depleting his 
retirement and IRA accounts from his employer and at the time of 
hearing he had approximately $400 left from those funds,, (T. 23). 
21. Janet Bowles testified that she had been working 
full-time for Alpine School District since 1985 and at the time of 
the hearing was earning $7.47 per hour for a gross monthly income 
of $1,284.85. (T. 60, 62). 
22. Mrs. Bowles testified that she had remarried and her 
husband earned $2,000 a month, that her household consisted of 
herself, her husband and her two children from her marriage to Mr. 
Bowles and that she had just purchased a new home and ci car. (T. 
63-66) 
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23. Mr, Bowles proffered a child support worksheet based 
on the income levels produced through discovery showing child 
support should be $194 total per month and proposed to the Court 
that his support obligation be reduced to $200 per month until he 
had graduated and was re-employed full-time. (Exhibit 8) 
24. The trial court held that there had not been a 
substantial, material change of circumstances to justify any 
adjustment to child support. The Court also commented that it did 
not find that Mr. Bowies' job search efforts reasonable and that 
the Court was aware that a lot of construction was going on in St. 
George. (T. 86) . 
Summary of the Argument 
1. The trial court failed to find a material change in 
circumstances to justify any adjustment to child support. Mr. 
Bowles had been involuntarily terminated from his employment and 
his income was reduced from $2,658 per month to income at the time 
of trial from unemployment compensation and part-time work 
totalling $1,154 per month. The Court's failure to find a 
substantial change of circumstances when the lay off was beyond the 
control of the individual and had resulted in a drastic, permanent 
loss of income is reversible error. 
2. In light of the proven loss of income earning 
ability of Mr. Bowies', the Court erred in not considering his 
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changed ability to pay support and ordering a modification of 
support, as required by U.C.A. §78-45-7(2)• Regardless of whether 
the Court was persuaded or not as to the reasonableness of Mr. 
Bowies' re-employment efforts, his lay off was involuntary and the 
Court had a duty to Order relief for some period of time or amount. 
3. Utah law requires a trial court to make specific, 
detailed findings on all material issues,. The trial court herein 
failed to make any findings as to Mr. Bowles' present income, his 
historical income, or as to why the Court felt his search for 
employment was not reasonable, in light of no contrary evidence. 
4» The trial court erred in not considering Mr. Bowies' 
unrefuted testimony about the unavailability of employment after a 
three month job search. Further, it was improper for the Court to 
discount this testimony based on the Court's own personal opinion 
that construction work was available in another city where no 
evidence or testimony had been presented to that effect. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court erred in not finding a material 
change in circumstances to justify an 
adjustment in child support. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 (1989), a trial 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support 
obligations and upon a request for such a modification a threshold 
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payment to conform to the parties' current income. To make no 
finding that circumstances have even changed is error and an abuse 
of discretion. That has been the holding in many cases before this 
Court. In the case of Christiansen v. Christiansen. 6(57 P.2d 592 
(Utah 1983), the Court held that in a determination of a change of 
circumstances justifying support modification, it is proper to 
consider changes in the parent's ability to pay support. 
Similarly, in the case of Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916 (Utah 1982), 
the Court affirmed that changes in the parties' incomes can 
constitute a material change of circumstances justifying 
modification of child support obligations. See also, Maughn v. 
Mauqhn. 770 P.2d 156 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
In review of this record, this Court must find that the 
Trial Court's finding of no change of circumstances is in fact 
clearly erroneous and reverse this finding. Mr. Bowlegs' lay off 
was a fact clearly beyond his control or ability to influence. It 
is manifest injustice not to find that this lay off was a sudden, 
adverse and material change in his circumstances that directly 
affected his ability to pay child support and justify relief from 
the ongoing support order. Regardless of whether the Trial Court 
was persuaded as to the reasonableness of Mr. Bowles' job search 
efforts after his termination, there can be no question but that 
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Ct. App. 1988), Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 42 (August 9, 
1990; Ct. App.). This Court has often reversed decisions where the 
trial Court has failed to make detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law necessary for consideration by a reviewing 
court. Stephens v. Stephens, 754 P.2d 1952 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
In the present case, no findings were made by Judge 
Christensen in this case on the ability of Mr Bowles to pay the 
former child support amount of $427 a month in his unemployed 
condition of reduced income. The Court gave no consideration to 
the changes in Mr. Bowies' income from $2,658 gross per month with 
Signetics to the level he was earning at the time of the hearing 
from unemployment compensation of $864 gross per month, plus part-
time earnings of $260 for a total of $1,124 gross per month. From 
this, $412 was automatically withheld for on-going support leaving 
him with $724 for his own expenses. The Court also gave no 
consideration to the fact that Mr. Bowles had expended all 
available financial resources consisting of his retirement 
distribution and IRA funds to satisfy his Court ordered obligations 
and expenses leaving him only with earned income to pay ongoing 
child support. Additionally, the Court ignored the facts that Mr. 
Bowles was current in support until his lay off and that no 
hardship situation existed with Mrs. Bowles who had a household 
income of $3,284 gross per month for a family of four which does 
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testified that Sign€5tics was a unique and superior' construction job 
as it was primarily a manufacturer of semiconductors with only 
secondary and limited construction needs. It was thus a major 
employer which provided full benefits, full-time employment and 
excellent wages, whereas typical construction work in his 
experience lasted from six to eight months in a given year, was 
sporadic, seasonal, not as well paid and provided no job benefits. 
(T. 15). Having no future employment prospects with Signetics, 
the Court can only consider Mr. Bowies' historic earnings in usual 
construction work before Signetics, or prevailing community 
standards as a relevant basis for imputing income under U.C.A. §78-
45-7.5(7). 
Mr. Bowles testified that prior to Signetics he was self-
employed in excavation work for three years from 1981 through 1983. 
The tax returns from those years were introduced as Exhibit 2 and 
in Addendum Chart 1 to this brief, Mr. Bowles has set forth the 
relevant income data from those tax returns. That Chart shows the 
gross receipts from each year, less business expenses with the 
adjustment that any depreciation has been added back in as a non-
cash expense which is not usually deducted for child support 
purposes* The three years outlined confirmed Mr. Bowies' testimony 
that typically the construction business is sporadic and 
unpredictable as his first year in business he had a net profit of 
$3,684, his second year it was $20,054 and his third year it was 
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machine for $20/hour but had never informed Mr. Bowles of this 
offer. (T. 46, 72, 73). Mr. Bowles also testified he had a 
brother-in-law in the excavation business who did not feel leasing 
the equipment in the St. George area was viable. (T. 58). Also, 
Mr- Bowles testified he had no time to operate the machine while he 
worked for Signetics or attended school and that it was to be sold 
by Court Order in November, 1990. (T. 55-58). Again, however, the 
Court makes no conclusion or actual "finding" from this comment as 
to whether that level of income should be imputed to Mr. Bowles for 
child support purposes. 
Notwithstanding this argument, the earning potential from 
the back hoe is irrelevant as the parties' Decree of Divorce, as 
modified, ordered that it be sold by November, 1990, and the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. (R. 54) (T. 55,57). 
This sale has been completed and the back hoe is no longer 
available for use by either party. 
POINT III 
The Court erred in failing to consider 
Appellant's evidence of his efforts to find 
employment and in erroneously taking judicial 
notice of disputed facts outside the record. 
Mr. Bowles testified that he was first aware that he 
would be laid off in August, 1989, and that he began his job search 
at that time. (T. 17). His search began with Job Service where he 
obtained unemployment compensation benefits and was required to 
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expenses were $1,200 plus $412 in support on an income of $1,124. 
Mrs.* Bowles had also refused his offer to temporarily adjust 
support until he was re-employed. The question thus becomes in 
these circumstances how long is it reasonable for Mr. Bowles to 
have waited to find construction employment? Mr. Bowles had to 
make a decision and determined that he could not survive 
financially through a prolonged period of unemployment and that 
prospects in the construction industry even if he found work were 
likely to remain unstable with sporadic work. Mr. Bowles submits 
it was not unreasonable to take advantage of a unique job 
retraining opportunity to learn basic new skills in a profession 
with long term stability and overall better benefits and pay. 
Importantly, the job training also promised a continued income to 
Mr» Bowles for at least a year so reasonable child support could 
still be paid. Eventually, Mrs. Bowles and the parties' two 
children will also benefit from Mr. Bowles7 retraining and the 
permanent career change with higher future child support. 
The Court's comment on Mr. Bowies' job search was simply 
that "there is no evidence to the Court that he has made a 
reasonable effort in the view of the Court" (T. 87). No other 
findings or rationale is provided to support this view. The Court 
also stated that "it appears to the Court that [St. George] is a 
moving construction area" (T. 87). Mr. Bowles submits that this 
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on such unreliable speculation. 
Mr. Bowles' employment at Signetics Company was a one-of-
above-average wages. When he was laid off from that position, I lis 
income earni ng ability was serious I ;r ai :;t :I permanent] y dimi nish EIJCJ ,, 
jobs which ai e traditiona 11 y seasona] ai :t ill i 11 istab 1 e . 01 i that basis 
the Court had a duty to find that a substanti a] , material change of 
to support 1 11 : , Bowles presented evidence of both a , :: 't n n s „] and 
historic earnings which were unrefuted yet totally i gnored by tl ie 
2 11 
Court. It was clearly an abuse of discretion to ignore this 
evidence and refuse to make any adjustment to support in light of 
Mr. Bowles' involuntary lay off, his good faith job search in a 
depressed industry and his reasonable decision to accept a job 
training opportunity which provided him income and excellent future 
career prospects which will benefit all concerned. 
Conclusion 
Based on the evidence and testimony the Trial Court had 
a duty to do the following: first, to find that a material, 
substantial change in circumstances had occurred based on Mr. 
Bowles' involuntary lay off; second, to review the required 
statutory factors on adjusting child support which include a review 
of Mr. Bowles' earning ability; third, to adjust Mr. Bowles' child 
support based on either his actual income where he was earning 
$1,124 per month at the time of the hearing, or on an imputed 
income basis according to §78-45-7.5(5)(c) using his actual 
historic earnings in typical construction as a basis for imputing 
income at the level of $738 gross per month. There was no 
justification in the record for the Court to make no change 
whatsoever to the Plaintiff's level of child support based on his 
involuntary termination and this Court should reverse the Trial 
Court's ruling and find that an adjustment of child support to $200 
per month should have been made effective with Mr. Bowles' date of 
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DATED this 1st day of February, I""I. 
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ADDENDUM 
I Chart 1 - Summary of Appellant's Earnings 
from Excavation Work 1981 - 1983 
II Transcript excerpt containing the Ruling of 
the Court. (T. 86-93). 
III U.C.A. §78-45-7(2) 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.5 
U.C.A. §30-3-5 
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CHART 1 
SUMMARY OF TRIAL EXHIBIT 2 
INCOME TAX RETURNS SHOWING INCOME FROM 
EXCAVATION WORK 
1981 - Gross Receipts $13,666 
Business Expenses 9.981 
1982 
1983 -
(Schedule C - No 
depreciation listed as no 
equipment was owned) 
Net Profit 
Gross Monthly Amount 
Gross Receipts 
Business Expenses 
( S c h e d u l e C 
Depreciation of $3, 
added back in) 
Net Profit 
Gross Monthly Amount 
Gross Receipts 
Business Expenses 
( S c h e d u l e C 
Depreciation of $4, 
added back in) 
Net Profit 
Gross Monthly Amount. 
,364 
r934 
Summary - Three Year Period 1981 to 
3,684 
$ 307 
$36,383 
16.690 
20,054 
$ 1,670 
$15,438 
12.592 
2,846 
$ 237 
1983 
Total Income - $26,584 
Average Annual Income - $8,861 
Average Monthly Income - $738 
1 • expenses. And there's a large sum of money that's tied up 
2 
4 
5 
6 
in the equity of that home. 
3 | Mrs. Bacon wishes to have access to her share of 
that equity. If Mr. Bowles feels that it's necessary for him! 
to keep that in the family, the home can be appraised with a 
fair market value and Mr. Bowles can buy Mrs. Bacon's equity 
7 | out of it. But she has a right to have her equity out of ! 
8 i that home. The home cannot be divided, actually, partitioned.! 
9 J And therefore the Court should order that it be sold and the ] 
10 equity divided between the parties. 
11 I Thank you. 
12 | THE COURT: Well, counsel, addressing 
13 J the issues that have been reserved in the pre-trial order. 
14 I First of all child support. Two things concern the 
15 Court about Mr. Bowles1 position. No question but what he 
16 : lost his job. The thing the Court is concerned about, though,) 
17 the effort that he's making to gain employment to supplement 
18 I that, his schooling. 
19 ! Now, the Court's only testimony, that I have before! 
20 I me, as I recall it: The efforts to get employment have been j 
21 made in this area or in the Salt Lake area. He checked the 
22 j board a couple of times in St. George. But by his own testi-
23 ; mony, it appears to the Court that that is a moving construe-j 
i 
24 j tion area. It would be whether he is occupying the seat on a 
25 j backhoe or working in some other capacity on a construction 
86 
job. The testimony is he 1 
Ifm not satisfie< 
employ himself, as he 
getting 
backhoe 
improve 
that he 
fully 
employment in that 
itself may not be 1 
his position . But 
nas the abil 
i that he T s 
might under 
operation. 
ity 
made 
the 
to do that. , 
an effort to 
circumstances, in 
It may be that the 
^he instrument by which he can i 
there r s no 
rs made a reasonable effort, in 
to obtain employment 
skilled 
evidence to the Court ! 
the 
in the field in which 
and capable of doing. 
view of the Court, | 
he is obviously 
In looking at the potential of that backhoe, I 
recognize that the only years here in which he made substantial] 
income was 1981-1982, he made about $1,400 a month. Consider-' 
ing, though, that he had a substantial amount of expense 
deduction by depreciation, which the Court does not believe 
to be a legitimate deduction from the standpoint of determin-
ing what his disposable income would be. 1983, $2,088 loss. 
As I recall, the depreciation that was claimed that year far '• 
exceeded that amount. He's got that backhoe up on the job. ! 
No expense to him, or no income to him. Testimony is that ! 
it could be leased for at least $20 an hour, 20 or 30 hours | 
a week. That appears to the Court to be $2,400. 
But even conservatively taking it, it will be 
23 j 
1 
24 I 
1 25 | 
$1,200 a month that the 
the use of that machine. 
what the implication of 
Court feels could be generated from 
I have difficulty in determining 
income, however, should be under the 
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1 j circumstances, since he hasn't really worked on that job. 
2 j But it does appear to the Court, in the statute, 
3 j where there is no recent work history on which the Court 
i 
I 
4 j could rely, that the Court can consider that a 40-hour minimun| 
5 wage is within the potential of this defendant. I'm not 
6 satisfied that one assumes his responsibility in going to 
7 j school after a day, I think it's common knowledge, many people) 
8 j go who work full time, hold down a full time job, carry a 
9 full load; that that isn't unreasonable to expect that one 
10 j do, particularly where one has a family to support. 
11 J So the Court doesn't believe that the evidence 
12 supports a justification at this point to reduce child sup-
13 j port. And the Court is going to deny the petition to modify, 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
on the basis that I've indicated. And I don't think the 
defendant is making a legitimate effort to obtain employment, 
I don't think he's making a legitimate effort to rent that 
machine or to use it in a productive way, that would be pro-
ductive of income. And for that reason, the Court does not 
believe that I can legitimately find a material change in 
circumstances that would justify the Court in reducing the 
obligation for child support at this time. 
Now with respect to visitation. It appears that 
the Order of the Court has heretofore been provided, as late 
24 i as February 27, 1989. I see no material change in the circum-j 
25 I stances of the parties which would justify the Court in making 
• • . ... . — _ _ _ . „ . 
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I 
t 
7 
1 ; a change in that Order; except to indicate that: 
2 ! Certainly, the plaintiff doesnft have any right to, 
3 j in my view, to a visitation during those extended periods of 
visitation when the defendant has the children during the 
summer months. Certainly, this visitation schedule must have 
taken into account the age of the children, the expectations 
of visitation. So that the Court does not believe that there 
can be any material change that would change that. 
It -- about telephone calls, as I see in here. 
But that ought to be, Mrs. Bacon, is something that you ought 
to recognize and give this man a chance to have every reason-
able visitation with his children. The more you encourage 
their love for him and his love to them, the better it's 
going to be for you. One thing about love, the more you 
give, the more you permit, the more there is. It isn't eat 
upon itself or deplete itself. And if each of you will recog-j 
nize that to the extent that you build the other up in the 
eyes of your children, you are going to enhance your own. 
status with those children. 
So the Court does believe that he ought to be per-
mitted to telephone these children, have them telephone him. 
If it's a long distance call, that may be something else, 
I don't know that the plaintiff ought to assume the expense 
for that. But certainly he ought to be able to, during 
reasonable times of the day, communicate with his children 
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during, over the telephone. 
As far as the tax exemption is concerned. The law, 
Federal law provided that that tax exemption be claimed by 
the person having paramount custody of the children. That 
does not mean, however, the Court cannot under proper circum-
stances order that a custodial parent sign the necessary 
waivers or documentation to permit the non-custodial parent 
to have the one or more of the children as dependents. 
However, in this case, since the defendant is un-
employed, doesn't have anytrhing, it doesn't appear to the 
Court that at this time that the appropriate thing for the 
Court to do is to order that. So the Court declines to make 
an order directing the plaintiff, to order that she sign 
waivers and permit the defendant to claim either of these 
children as dependents for tax purposes. 
And when the defendant does become productive of 
income, as I think he?s capable of doing, that may be an 
appropriate time to consider whether or not he ought to be 
entitled to claim an exception for such purpose. 
Well, with respect to the home in Nephi. These 
parties are co-tenants, and said "joint-tenants," I thought 
I read in the file that they were "tenants in common.11 
MR. CHUNTZ: I believe I mis-spoke myself, 
24 j your Honor. 
25 | THE COURT: E i t h e r way, t h a t d o e s n ' t 
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1 I determine what ought to be done. The law doesn't require 
2 1 co-tenants to remain such if one of them doesn't want to be. 
i 
I think the expectation is that this property be sold. And 
since these parties are having financial difficulties, it!s 
obvious to the Court that that is one solution that may help 
alleviate some of the problems that exist. 
So the Court doesn't have any information as to 
how the rental income compares with the mortgage payment and I 
the expenses of upkeep. But the Court is going to Order in 
that case, No. 6527, that that property be sold, put on the 
market; that either can list the property for sale. 
If the listing institution requires that both signa-j 
tures appear, the Court is going to Order that both of you 
sign a listing agreement. If there's a dispute as to the 
amount at which it ought to be listed, you've got a figure 
of some, what is it, about $36,000, which may or may not be 
accurate at this time, since that was a 1986 appraisal. It 
may be that you'll have to get an appraisal and listed at 
some appropriate amount, and either offer it for sale at that 
amount or, if one or the other of the parties wants to buy 
out the other, it ought to be permitted, it seems to the 
Court. 
Maybe Mr. Bowles would like to do that, since it 
did initially come as a gift from his parents to these two 
parties. 
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The expenses of sale, commissions, if any, payment 
of the existing mortgage, all ought to come off of the sale 
proceeds before those matters are disbursed. 
And if either party obtains a legitimate offer, 
there's a dispute as to that, then the Court would have to 
hear evidence and to take testimony, I suppose, as to whether 
or not to require one or the other to accept such a sale, if 
that becomes a matter in dispute. 
Ifm going to direct that you prep an order, finding^ 
of fact, conclusions of law, consistent with what Ifve ruled 
here today, Mr. Chuntz. Forward those to counsel for the 
defendant, for her approval as to form. If they are not 
approved with a statutory time, then you may submit them to 
the Court for signature; or she may of course file her objec-
tions to the order is it may be submitted, if she has any. 
Mr. Bowles, I think you have the ability and the 
means to do more than you are doing. And that's the basis 
that the Court is making the ruling that I am today. If .you 
legitimately cannot get work in an area where you've indicated 
and I think where the Court can take judicial notice of the 
fact that there's a lot of construction, a lot of work going 
on, that: you need to do it. You can't just sit back for a 
j couple c 
1 hope 
i 
ible, 
to 
I 
of years 
improve 
while thi 
yourself 
understand that, 
sse 
and 
it' 
children are j 
i get a better 
s certainly a 
growing up < 
job, 
lot 
That 
better 
and 
!s 
to 
then 
laud-
be in 
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1 . a stable industry than it is to be in one in which you are 
2 j beset by weather. But in the meantime, these children have a 
j 
3 j right to be supported. They have a right to, for your con-
4 ! tribution toward that effort. And it needs to be a reasonably 
5 I and legitimate effort on your part. If you cannot and you've 
6 | made an effort of that nature, the Court doesn't feel that yoif 
7 ! have, at this juncture, then sometime in the future the Court 
8 j may be in a position to consider it further. 
9 j So, I appreciate your input, counsel. And, we'll 
10! be in recess. 
11 I (WHEREUPON, the Court stood in recess at 4:35 
12 | o'clock p.m.) 
13 | . . . 
14 ! 
I 
15 I 
16 ! 
17
 i 
18 | 
[ 
19 j 
20 ! 
! 
21 , 
J 
22 | 
i 
23 i 
! 
24 
25 i 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Jefferies v. JefTeries. 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 
978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 
1987). 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebutta-
ble guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by pirior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective suppon: shall re-
quire each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines 
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties: 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess 
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; and 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in 
support of spouse and children. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7: 1977. ch. 
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214. § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, divided former 
Subsection (2) into present Subsections <2) and 
'3) by substituting the language beginning re-
quire each party" at the end of Subsection (2) 
and the introductory language in Subsection 
t3) for "consider all relevant factors including 
but not limited to:"; rewrote Subsection (3)(e), 
which had read, "the need of the obligee"; sub-
stituted "ages" for "age" in Subsection (3)(f); 
redesignated former Subsection (3) as Subsec-
tion (4): deleted former Subsection (4), provid-
ing for the establishment and use of a uniform 
statewide assessment formula: and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
fa) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorneys fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212: L. added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
1909. ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917. § 3000: R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections i3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943. 40-3-5: L. 1969. ch. 72, § 3; inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979. ch. 110, $ 1; 1984, ch. Subsection 14); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72. § 1; 1985. ch. 100, § 1. tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection i5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection <1): tutingff However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
443 
78-45-7.4 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of. 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of this 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines ''gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
'3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance: and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
'5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
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(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based upon employment poten-
tial and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qual-
ifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
<a If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding offi-
cer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
'd) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills: or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
Historv: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989. chi 214, § 7. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. Chapter 214 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
{1) As used in the guidelines, ''adjusted gross income" is the amount calcu-
lated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered. 
12) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting 
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the 
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross income for 
alimony. 
Historv: C. 1953. 78-45-7.6, enacted by L. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989. ch! 214. $ 8. Utah Const.. Art. VI. Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. Chapter 214 
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